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The Socrates of Xenophon

Of course, no reasonable man ought to insist that the facts are exactly as I have described them.... We should use such accounts to inspire ourselves with confidence, and that is why I have already drawn out my tale so long. (Plato, Phaedo 114d, tr. Tredennick)

Or maybe they are just as Xenophon describes them. We ought, in any case, to retell these stories often, to try to understand the ideals and encourage ourselves to be like the human being these stories are told about. Socrates represents both a way of philosophizing (a standard for knowing and way of testing claims to knowledge) and a way of life (rational moral virtue).

Nothing gives me more pleasure than recalling the Socrates I knew, whether I speak of him myself or listen to someone else who knew him. (ibid. 58d)

Texts by Xenophon: Memorabilia, tr. E.C. Marchant, and Symposium, tr. O.J. Todd. Unless noted, references are to the Memorabilia and to these translators. (Xenophon also wrote an Apology or "Socrates' Defense", quite different from Plato's.)

Xenophon was an Athenian who lived circa 428/7-354 B.C. Socrates was put to death in 399 B.C.

Preface: Between the Socrates of Plato and the Socrates of Xenophon there are many resemblances. But it may be (or it may not be) that Xenophon's Socrates is slightly less a literary invention (and spokesman for its inventor) than is the Socrates of Plato. Xenophon's Socrates is less ironical in his treatment of others, more down to earth, and more amiable than Plato's Socrates.

In Xenophon's account, philosophy has its foundation in everyday experience rather than in Plato's preconceptions (ideas Plato derived from Heraclitus and Parmenides, his first teachers in philosophy, rather than from Socrates). Socratic definition in Xenophon does not assume the existence of otherworldly (suprasensible, i.e. not perceptible to the senses) Forms (or Archetypes) which were Plato's own creation.

But, on the other hand, according to Aristotle writing as an historian (Metaphysics 1078b), Socrates used the method of induction and essential definition to seek the defining common natures (essences) of the moral virtues, and this is not found in Xenophon, which tells against the historicity of Xenophon's account (Plato does not use induction in his dialogs, which also distinguishes Plato from the historical Socrates).

In the search for the historical Socrates there are the Socrates of Plato and the Socrates of Xenophon to think about, as well as the Socrates of Aristotle, the not-so-ancient Socrates of Diogenes Laertius and Socrates in Plutarch.

Comparing all, what we find is a Socrates concerned only with ethics, ("no small matter, but how to live", in Plato's words). According to Diogenes Laertius, Socrates was the first to make ethics ("life and all that has to do with us") a branch of philosophy, which is the thoroughgoing use of natural reason in seeking to understand elementary and final things.

And we find a Socrates for whom philosophy is discourse of reason, dialog or discussion, seeking to know the good for man, because if anyone knows what the good is, he will do what is good, and a Socrates who seeks always to "grow in goodness" by doing what is good and who wants his companions to grow in goodness as well.

What is most absent from Xenophon is the Socrates who knows only his own ignorance, an ignorance testified to by all other authors.

Notes: According to the highly speculative entry for Xenophon in the OCD 2nd edition, the Memorabilia's Books 1-2 were written c. 381 B.C., and Books 3-4 c. 355-354; Xenophon's Symposium was written c. 366-365; and Xenophon's Apology c. 386 B.C. But for the Memorabilia's date, Seyffert's Dictionary has only "after 393 B.C."

The Introduction to Marchant's translation says that 'Memorabilia' is the Latin rendering of the Greek title, but that a closer rendering would be Memoirs: the Acts and Sayings of Socrates that are Worthy of Memory (as I translate the Introduction's Latin).

Outline of this page ...

If a man knows anything

If a man knows anything, he can explain what he knows to others (and defend his explanation when questioned by his companions). That is the Socratic definition of 'to know something', namely that the explanation is clear in meaning and does not contradict either reason or experience.

The very word 'discussion', according to [Socrates], owes its name to the practice of meeting together for common deliberation, sorting, discussing [classifying] things after their kind: and therefore one should be ready and prepared for this and be zealous for it ... (Memorabilia iv, 5, 12)

Other words for 'discussion' are 'dialog' and 'dialectic', which are all names for the method of question and answer.

I will try also to show how he encouraged his companions to become skilled in discussion. Socrates held that those who know what any given thing is can also expound it to others; on the other hand, those who do not know are misled themselves and mislead others. For this reason he never gave up considering with his companions what any given thing is. (ibid. iv, 6, 1)

To 'know' means To 'be able to give an account'

The meaning of the word 'know' Socrates chose is the standard that makes philosophy objective (verifiable), just as Wittgenstein chose the meaning of the word 'meaning' that makes the distinction between sense and nonsense objective (verifiable) in philosophy. Knowledge and meaning in philosophy are both public events (objective, verifiable).

Both philosophers "want an account of what you know", either (1) that you explain and defend (justify) what you know in discussion (Socrates), or (2) that you give a description (an "explanation of meaning") of your use of language (Wittgenstein). Philosophy is discourse of reason.

Love for wisdom and virtue

The mottos for this Web site are the mottos of Socratic philosophy, the basic aim of which is not to think you know what you don't know (which is what Platonic preconceptions and hypotheses are, thinking you know what you don't know, refuges for ignorance). The reason for this is "reverence for truth" (A. Schweitzer). Methods can be taught, but not reverence. This applies to Socrates and his companions, for some were only good when they were with him (Memorabilia i, 2, 24).

"Expound", "Explain", "Render an account"

Marchant's "could expound it to others" is rendered by W.K.C. Guthrie as "Socrates held that if a man knew anything, he could give an account (the Greek maid-of-all-work word is 'logos') of it to others", and according to Guthrie, by 'an account' is meant something quite like 'a definition' (Socrates (1971) iii, 3, p. 116). But which kind of definition -- (1) an explanation of meaning, which is convention (rule) for using a word, or (2) an hypothesis (thesis) about the essential nature of a thing named by a word? It seems the latter is intended, whether or not that is what is accomplished.

Examples of definition in Xenophon are Wisdom, Beauty, and Madness.

Another translation of Memorabilia iv, 6, 1

I shall now try to describe how Socrates made his associates better at logical discussion. He believed that those who understand the nature of any given thing would be able to explain it to others as well, whereas it was no wonder (he said) if those who did not understand made mistakes themselves and misled others. Consequently he never stopped investigating, with the help of his companions, the meaning of every single term. (Memorabilia iv, 6, 1, tr. Tredennick)

[Socratic "account" versus Plato's "knowledge = true belief plus an account" (Theaetetus 201c-d)]

Always Obtaining Step-by-Step Agreement

An essential part of Socrates' method in logic (Socratic dialog, dialectic or question-and-answer) is: In every discussion to first obtain acceptance [agreement] from his interlocutor [discussant, companion] before going on to the next step of the investigation (Memorabilia iv, 6, 14-15).

[The method of Socrates was to invite his companion] to join him in the search for truth by the dialectical method of question and answer. (Guthrie, Socrates iii, 5, p. 127)

Using definitions to help make someone's thinking clear

Another essential part of Socrates' method was that he used definitions to clarify confused thinking.

Whenever anyone argued with him on any point without being able to make himself clear, asserting but not proving, that so and so was wiser or an abler politician or braver or what not, he [Socrates] would lead the whole discussion back to the definition [logos] required ... (Memorabilia iv, 6, 13)

By this process of leading back the argument even his adversary came to see the truth clearly. Whenever he himself argued out a question, he advanced by steps that gained general assent, holding this to be the only sure method. Accordingly, whenever he argued, he gained a greater measure of assent from his hearers than any man I have known. He said that Homer gave Odysseus the credit of being "a safe speaker" [Odyssey viii, 171] because he had a way of leading the discussion from one acknowledged truth to another. (iv, 6, 14-15)

Remarking that they were all of one mind on this point ... he went on ... (Xenophon, Symposium iv, 56, 60)

In the Sophist Plato writes: "Each school pursues its own argument to the conclusion without caring about whether we follow what they say or get left behind" (243b, tr. Cornford). That is not what a Socratic dialectician does (Theaetetus 167d-168a).

Socratic Definition in Xenophon

"And what of Wisdom? How shall we describe it? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise about what they know, or are some wise about what they do not know?"

"About what they know, obviously; for how can a man be wise about the things he doesn't know?"

"The wise, then, are wise by knowledge?"

"How else can a man be wise if not by knowledge?"

"Do you think that wisdom is anything but that by which men are wise?"

"No."

"It follows that Wisdom is Knowledge?"

"I think so."

"Then do you think it possible for a man to know all things?"

"Of course not -- nor even a fraction of them."

"So an all-wise man is an impossibility?"

"Of course, of course."

"Consequently everyone is wise just in so far as he knows?"

"I think so." (Memorabilia iv, 6, 7)

Question: What is the difference in this particular instance between saying what wisdom is and saying what we mean by the word 'wisdom'? Is there any difference other than that the first form of expression suggests that there is a phenomenon, namely wisdom, independent of conceptualization (a suggestion which is both a misunderstanding and, when examined, an undefined combination of words).

The good is the useful or beneficial

"Now to seek the Good, Euthydemus: is this the way?"

"What do you mean?"

"Does it seem to you that the same thing is useful to everyone?"

"No."

"In fact, what is useful to one may sometimes be hurtful to another, don't you think?"

"Assuredly."

"Should you call anything good except what is useful?"

"No."

"Consequently what is useful is good for him to whom it is useful?"

"I think so." (Memorabilia iv, 6, 7-8)

That is Socrates' "non-moral identification of good with useful" (W.K.C. Guthrie, Plato: the man and his dialogues: earlier period (1975), p. 91).

"Growing in goodness"

However, it would be very strange to say that when Xenophon has Socrates say that he is "growing in goodness" (Memorabilia i, 6, 9; iv, 8, 6) Socrates means that he is growing in usefulness. What then might he mean?

By "growing in goodness" Socrates might mean that he is choosing to act rightly more and more often, and that acting rightly is thus becoming more and more a habit for him and thereby becoming more and more sweet to him (Epictetus, fragment). But then it is not always true that the "the good is what is useful", for it is good to do the good (act rightly = act in accord with the specific excellence that is proper to man) regardless of whether doing what is good is useful for anything.

On the other hand, if Xenophon means by "growing in goodness" that Socrates is growing in usefulness, how might that to be understood? Here is one possibility: Socrates becomes more useful to himself as he becomes more knowledgeable about what is useful. If "doing what is good" depends on "knowing what is good", Socrates must be growing in knowledge, both of what he knows and of what he does not know. And by not thinking he knows what he does not know he becomes more useful to his companions by not misleading them (Memorabilia iv, 6, 1) and by being more modest and gentle (Theaetetus 210b-c).

The soul, Plato and Socrates contrasted

Schweitzer questioned whether Plato's "conception of the good [as the] well-being of the soul" belongs also to the historical Socrates. Xenophon, too, uses the expression "care of the soul" (i, 2, 4). But the word 'soul' is equivocal here.

Referring to "the soul" (psyche) Socrates means no more than man as an ethical being -- because anything more would be to think he knows what he does not know. It is Plato who presumes to mean more, using the word 'soul' as the name of a thing, a thing which Plato argues is a distinct substance from the body, suprasensible and immortal.

Furthermore, Socrates has no need to speculate about "what the soul is", because the answer does not affect Socratic ethics (how man should live his life) which is decided by the specific excellence proper to man (namely rational moral virtue).

In Plato's Apology 29e, Socrates speaks of the "perfecting of the soul" as what should be the principal concern for the human being (Guthrie, Plato ... earlier period p. 89; cf. Plato, Apology 36c). That is, the moral perfecting (or perfecting in virtue) of the human being.

Socrates' concern in philosophy is ethics, but also logic because Socratic ethics is rational (reasoned reflection) and therefore Socrates wants not to think he knows what he does not know, deceiving himself, something which speculative metaphysics may easily become.

"Socrates' many definitions" (Xenophon)

Although the Socrates of Plato knows only his own ignorance and is unable to define ethical terms (i.e. define = state essential or universal definitions of the moral virtues), the Socrates of Xenophon knows "many definitions".

To go through all his definitions would be an arduous task. I will say only enough to indicate his method ... (Memorabilia iv, 6, 1)

Self-control and Knowledge (Prudence and Wisdom)

Between Wisdom and Prudence be drew no distinction; but if a man knows and practises what is beautiful and good, knows and avoids what is base, that man he judged to be both wise and prudent.

When asked further whether he thought that those who know what they ought to do and yet do the opposite are at once wise and vicious, he answered: "No; not so much that, as both unwise and vicious. For I think that all men have a choice between various courses, and choose and follow the one which they think conduces most to their advantage. Wherefore I hold that those who follow the wrong course are neither wise nor prudent."

"... those who know what they ought to do and yet do the opposite" or is it those who say they know but believe contrariwise, because a man will always do what he truly (sincerely) believes to be good (or at least not truly harmful).

"... all men have a choice between various courses." But if a man's choices are determined by his belief about what is good, then does he have a choice?

"... follow the one which they think conduces most to their advantage." Aristotle states that "the good has rightly been defined as that at which all things aim" (Nicomachean Ethics 1094a). All things pursue their perceived advantage = all things aim for their perceived good. If a thing misperceives the good for itself (its "advantage"), then the thing is unwise, imprudent and the opposite of virtuous (namely vicious); the same is true if the thing does not "know and avoid what is base".

Those who are mistaken about what is good cannot do what is good

He said that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom. "For just actions and all forms of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail.... Therefore since just actions and all other forms of beautiful and good activity are virtuous actions, it is clear that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom." (Memorabilia iii, 9, 5)

If moral virtue is knowledge of what is good, then to know what is good is likewise to do what is good, and not to know is to do something else which in one's ignorance one believes to be the good. The principle here is All living things aim for their perceived good.

If someone misperceives what is good, he cannot do what is good, because he will always aim for what he perceives to be good. And contrariwise, if someone perceives what is good, he cannot fail to do what is good.

The proposition 'Everyone seeks what he believes to be the good, and therefore to be morally virtuous is for one's belief to be true' is a proposition Plato might accept. But it is misleading. First, by the Socratic standard, it is itself unvirtuous to guess or have untested opinions (because that is thinking you know what you don't know). Second, only the one who knows whether a given thing is virtuous can know whether the belief is true -- and the belief can only be true if it is possible to know whether it is true, and if it is possible to known, then it is unvirtuous not to know.

The Socratic precept is the Delphic precept Know thyself, not hold opinions that have not been tested in discussion. Rational moral virtue implies that "If anyone claims to know anything, he can justify his claim to others" (Memorabilia iv, 6, 1). Philosophy is discourse of reason.

Two Logics of Language

The use of capital letters, e.g. 'Wisdom', 'Prudence', 'Justice', appears to be the translator Marchant's way of identifying a definition. According to one view, there is a difference between describing the use of a word in the language, e.g. the word 'wisdom', and saying what the thing named by the word 'wisdom', namely, Wisdom, is. Socrates' logic of language is: words are names, and the meaning of a name is the thing the name stands for (regardless of whether that thing is tangible or abstract).

In contrast, in Wittgenstein's logic of language there are no hypotheses about the nature of things presumed to be named by "abstract terms". This is because "abstractions" (ideas, concepts) are rules for using language; an hypothesis about what the rules for a particular abstract term, e.g. 'wisdom', are would be an hypothesis about the use of language, not an hypothesis about whatever thing the term 'wisdom' is imagined to name.

"The good" (Aristotle)

"... the good has rightly been defined" (Aristotle). Obviously that is not a definition of the word 'good'. For we cannot say that the meaning of the word 'good' is 'that at which all things aim', even if it is true that all things do aim for their good (or perceived good).

Is the proposition 'Moral virtue is knowledge' a statement of fact, or is it e.g. a way of looking at (or framing) ethics? (It is not easy to see what its grammar is.)

Not knowing oneself. Thinking oneself wise when one is not. And madness

Madness ... according to him, was the opposite of Wisdom. Nevertheless he did not identify Ignorance with Madness; but not to know yourself, and to assume and think that you know what you do not, he put next to Madness. (Memorabilia iii, 9, 6)

One can hardly know oneself if one thinks one knows what one does not know.

Socrates explains "Know Thyself"

Hereupon Socrates exclaimed : "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi? .... Then did you notice somewhere on the temple the inscription 'Know thyself'? ... And what do you suppose a man must know to know himself, his own name merely? Or must he consider what sort of a creature he is ... and get to know his own powers ...?"

"That leads me to think that he who does not know his own powers is ignorant of himself."

"Is it not clear too that through self-knowledge men come to much good, and through self-deception to much harm? For those who know themselves, know what things are expedient for themselves and discern their own powers and limitations. (Memorabilia iv, 2, 24-26)

"But perhaps you never even thought about these things, because you felt so confident that you knew them." (iv, 2, 36)

There are two elements to Know thyself: (1) Know "what sort of a creature" a human being is, and (2) know what your "own powers" as an individual human being are.

The specific excellence (areté) proper to a donkey is not the specific excellence proper to a man, and the "powers" specific to a blind man are not the powers specific to sighted man (The wise man does not over-reach or under-reach himself).

Rational self-interest

For Xenophon's Socrates 'ethics' can be defined as 'knowledge of the good for oneself', which is to say 'knowledge of what is truly useful or beneficial to oneself'. Even friendship is measured by that standard. In contrast, for Plato's Socrates ethics is more than rational self-interest: the good man harms no one and benefits even his enemies (Republic 335b-d); ethics is concerned with disinterested justice ("doing one's duty to men", as piety is doing one's duty to God).

To what depth should we study anything but ethics?

[Socrates] taught his companions how far a well-educated man should make himself familiar with any given subject. For instance, he said that the study of geometry should be pursued until the student was competent to measure a parcel of land [The etymology of the Greek word 'geometry' is: "to measure the earth"] .... He was against carrying the study of geometry so far as to include the more completed figures on the ground that ... they were enough to occupy a lifetime, to the complete exclusion of many other useful studies. (Memorabilia iv, 7, 2-3)

In Plato's Phaedrus 229e-230a, Socrates says of a skeptic who intends to reduce all the myths about the gods to something natural and plausible, that this fellow will need a lot of time to do it, whereas Socrates himself has no such time to spare, and this is because he still has not complied with the Delphic command to "know thyself" and that until he does that it would be foolish to enquire into secondary matters.

Xenophon's literary character Socrates

Xenophon sometimes attributes his own unexceptional ideas to Socrates, as e.g. that a man should be deeply learned and skilled in the work that is appropriate for him as an individual. Sometimes Xenophon's platitudes suggest Hamlet's Polonius.

When someone asked him what seemed to him the best pursuit for a man, he answered: "Doing well." Questioned further, whether he thought good luck a pursuit, he said: "On the contrary, I think luck and doing well are opposite poles. To hit on something right by luck without search I call good luck, to do something well after study and practice I call doing well; and those who pursue this seem to me to do well. And the best men and dearest to the gods," he added, "are those who do their work well; if it is farming, as good farmers; if medicine, as good doctors; if politics, as good politicians [i.e. statesmen]. He who does nothing well is neither useful in any way nor dear to the gods." (iii, 9, 14-15)

He did also try to make his companions efficient in affairs ... For holding that it is good for anyone who means to do honourable work to have self-control, he made it clear to his companions, in the first place, that he had been assiduous in self-discipline; moreover, in his conversation he exhorted his companions to cultivate self-control above all things. (iv, 5, 1)

[More about self-control: Socrates and flute-girls, the place the appreciation of beautiful things has in a philosophical life.]

Should another's ignorance make one angry?

Of a man who was angry because his greeting was not returned: "Ridiculous!" he exclaimed; "you would not have been angry if you had met a man in worse health; and yet you are annoyed because you have come across someone with ruder manners!" (Memorabilia iii, 13, 1)

Ignorance, and what else is incivility, may be compared to a bad state of health -- although Xenophon's Socrates did not equate ignorance with madness. (An ignorant man can be disabused of his ignorance, but not a madman.)

Why does Socrates himself never "render an account"?

Hippias [of Elis in the Peloponnese], who had not been in Athens for a considerable time, found Socrates talking: he was saying that if you want to have a man taught cobbling or building or smithing or riding, you know where to send him to learn the craft ... And yet, strangely enough, if you want to learn Justice yourself, or to have your son or servant taught it, you know not where to go for a teacher."

When Hippias heard this, "How now?" he cried in a tone of raillery, "still the same old sentiments, Socrates, that I heard from you so long ago?"

"Yes, Hippias," he replied, "always the same, and -- what is more astonishing -- the same topics too! You are so learned that I daresay you never say the same thing on the same subjects."

"I certainly try to say something fresh every time."

"Do you mean, about what you know? For example, in answer to the question, "How many letters are there in 'Socrates' and how do you spell it?" do you try to say something different now from what you said before? Or take figures: suppose you are asked if twice five are ten, don't you give the same answer now as you gave before?"

"About letters and figures, Socrates, I always say the same thing, just like you. As for Justice, I feel confident that I can now say that which neither you nor anyone else can contradict.... But I vow you shall not hear unless you first declare your own opinion about the nature of justice; for it's enough that you mock at others, questioning and examining everybody, and never willing to render an account yourself or to state an opinion about anything."

"Indeed, Hippias! Haven't you noticed that I never cease to declare my notions of what is just?"

"And how can you call that an account?"

"I declare them by my deeds, anyhow, if not by my words. Don't you think that deeds are better evidence than words?" (Memorabilia iv, 4, 5-10)

But of course that is not what Socrates calls "an account" -- for it is not an explanation of what he thinks he knows that can be put to the tests of reason and experience in the cross-questioning of discussion. Socratic philosophy is discourse of reason.

Why Plato says that Socrates "never renders an account of what he knows": (1) because Socrates does not claim to know anything of much importance (Apology 21d), and (2) because Socrates is like a barren midwife: he can help others to give birth to ideas but can give birth to none himself (Theaetetus 150b-c).

... by precept and by example alike [Socrates] strove to increase in his companions Piety and Prudence. (Memorabilia iv, 3, 18)

"Relative Definitions"

When Aristippus attempted to cross-examine Socrates in the same fashion as he had been cross-examined by him ... Socrates, wishing to benefit his companions, answered like a man who is resolved to do what is right, and not like a debater guarding against any distortion of the argument. (Memorabilia iii, 8, 1)

"... to do what is right" means to act as a companionable dialectician, i.e. one who seeks the truth rather than merely to win an argument, as the Sophists were said to have done.

Socrates' method in both Xenophon and Plato (in the early dialogs) is, not to offer opinions, but to ask questions ("dialectic" or "logic"). But where in the following discussion are the "essences" or "common natures" that Plato has Socrates seek (and that Aristotle says that the historical Socrates did in fact seek)?

Need Xenophon's Socrates have said as does Plato's Socrates in the Euthyphro that "the holy is always one and the same thing in every action" (5d)? Need the good always be one and the same thing (a good man, a good donkey, a good deed)? When Aristippus asks for "the essence of the good" (in order to convict Socrates of contradiction), Socrates replies: good for what? Nothing is good in itself, but only in relation to what it is useful for.

Is it correct to say that there is a sharp contrast with Plato here, that in Xenophon there is no demand for essences: a definition can be "relative to this or that", not absolute? But in Plato as well, the good for a thing is the specific excellence that is proper to that thing, e.g. a good book, a good net? That is the essence of 'the good for a thing'; that is absolute; what is relative is what the specific excellence is.

Again, on the one hand 'good' = 'useful' is an essential, absolute or general definition; but on the other hand, that definition's meaning must be explained by examples (any explanation of meaning is a definition), and examples are relative to this or that set of facts.

Is 'absolute good' nonsense?

Aristippus asked if he knew of anything good, in order that if Socrates mentioned some good thing ... he might show that it is sometimes bad. But [Socrates], knowing that when anything troubles us we need what will put an end to the trouble, gave the best answer: "Are you asking me," he said, "whether I know of anything good for a fever?"

"No, not that."

.....

"For hunger?"

"No, not for hunger either."

"Well, but if you are asking me whether I know of anything good in relation to nothing, I neither know nor want to know." (Memorabilia iii, 8, 2-3)

Is nothing good in itself or absolutely, rather than only relatively, good, then? Or in other words, is only what is useful good?

The Greek word kalos ("beautiful")

The Greek word kalos usually translated as 'beautiful' (or 'handsome') also means: 'glorious', 'noble', 'excellent', 'fine'. (Note by O.J. Todd to his translation of the Xenophon's Symposium (v, 4)). The word-form kalon may be translated as 'the beautiful' or 'beauty'.

Likewise the Greek word agathos may be translated as 'good', agathon as 'the good' or 'goodness'.

H.D.F. Kitto translates kalos ("beautiful") as 'worthy of admiration', or, 'fine'. He writes that the Greek word was applied across [the various] categories of the ethical, the intellectual, the aesthetic, the practical. The Greek word might be applied to any category and may therefore to be variously translated depending on which category it is applied to (A woman may be "beautiful", but so may a weapon, a harbor).

The same is the case with the Greek word areté ("virtue"), which Kitto translates as 'excellence'. It may sometimes be appropriate to translate moral excellence as 'virtue', but there is also an excellence appropriate to cart-horses. (The Greeks (1951) x)

The difference between the English word 'beautiful' and the Greek word 'kalon' can be compared to the difference between the English word 'beautiful' and the Italian word bello, the Italian word meaning, like the Greek, 'of excellent quality', 'eminently serviceable', or 'a thing well done', not only 'handsome (to the eyes, the ears)'. The difficulty of defining the Greek word appears in Plato's Greater Hippias, a dialog also known as "On Beauty".

Things are good and beautiful relative to what they are useful for

Again Aristippus asked him whether he knew of anything beautiful: "Yes, many things," he replied.

"All like one another?"

"On the contrary, some are as unlike as they can be."

"How then can that which is unlike the beautiful be beautiful?"

"The reason, of course, is that a beautiful wrestler is unlike a beautiful runner, a shield beautiful for defence is utterly unlike a javelin beautiful for swift and powerful hurling."

"That is the same answer as you gave to my question whether you knew of anything good."

"You think, do you, that good is one thing and beautiful another? Don't you know that all things are both beautiful and good in relation to the same things? In the first place, Virtue is not a good thing in relation to some things and a beautiful thing in relation to others. Men, again, are called "beautiful and good" in the same respect and in relation to the same things: it is in relation to the same things that men's bodies look beautiful and good and that all other things men use are thought beautiful and good, namely, in relation to those things for which they are useful."

"Is a dung basket beautiful then?"

"Of course, and a golden shield is ugly, if the one is well made for its special work and the other badly."

"Do you mean that the same things are both beautiful and ugly?"

"Of course -- and both good and bad. For what is good for hunger is often bad for fever, and what is good for fever bad for hunger; what is beautiful for running is often ugly for wrestling, and what is beautiful for wresting ugly for running. For all things are good and beautiful in relation to those purposes for which they are well adapted, bad and ugly in relation to those for which they are ill adapted." (Memorabilia iii, 8, 4-7; cf. Plato, Protagoras 334a-c)

The purpose for which a thing is "well adapted" is the specific excellence proper to that thing or the areté of that thing.

The proposition 'The same things are both beautiful and ugly' is example of a contradiction with a use in the language. 'This is beautiful and this is not beautiful', pointing at a thing from different points of view, is a contradiction in form, but not a contradiction in sense. (In Wittgenstein's logic of language -- i.e. definition of 'meaning' -- language meaning is not determined by form but by use.) Contradictions in sense are what refute a claim to knowledge in Socratic discussion (dialectic or dialog).

The Good and the Useful

What in the Greek world-picture do all things have in common? Their usefulness for the fulfillment of their specific purpose (Guthrie, Socrates p. 122). But question: "A knife may be good for killing, but is killing good?" Here there two distinct and very different questions. When we ask "Is killing good?" we are asking "Is it good for man to kill?" -- i.e. we are asking a question about man, about the excellence that is proper to man. The knife, simply considered as an instrument, is good for killing (if it fulfills its specific purpose e.g. as an instrument of war).

... all things are good and beautiful in relation to those purposes for which they are well adapted. (Memorabilia iii, 8, 7)

Note that 'to fulfill a thing's specific purpose' = 'to exist in accord with the excellence that is proper to the thing'. From that point of view, an individual man is "useful for the fulfillment of his specific purpose" to the extent that he lives in accord with the excellence that is proper to man, which, unique among all life, is to be governed by reason.

In the Greek context, the words 'good', 'useful', and "beautiful" (i.e. 'excellent', 'fine') may not be identical in meaning, but it does seem that to understand the meaning of one, you must understand the meaning of the others.

The mind of thorough-going reason (Socratic ethics)

In contrast to later philosophers, Socrates held that ethics is a thoroughly rational part of philosophy. According to Aristotle (Metaphysics 987b), Socrates was the first to seek universal definitions in ethics. This is because, in Socrates' view, reason is the specific excellence proper to man and therefore man should seek to be guided in all things by reason (a universal definition is a rational guide).

Reason, I said to myself, is given us that we may bring everything within the range of its action. (A. Schweitzer, Memoirs of Childhood and Youth (1925), tr. Campion, iii)

Other philosophers have held that man's life should be guided by non-rational (or irrational) "absolute values", "categorical imperatives", "convictions", "conscience", "the passions". What, then, according to them would be the specific excellence proper to man? Instinct, apparently. Nothing could be more contrary to the Socratic answer to the Delphic precept "Know thyself", namely rational moral virtue.

"Good in itself" in Xenophon

... if you are asking me whether I know of anything good in relation to nothing (Memorabilia iii, 8, 3).

Does 'good' DEF.= 'useful' in Xenophon's vocabulary? Is 'good in itself' = 'useful in itself' nonsense? (Is 'good', like 'useful', an essentially relative concept?)

Is the concept 'good in itself' found in the thought-world of Xenophon's Socrates? Above I wrote "When Aristippus asks for the essence of the good, Socrates replies: good for what? Nothing is good in itself, but only in relation to what it is useful for." What would we say is good in itself, good regardless of whether it is useful for anything? The fine arts: music, painting ...

Is nothing worth having for its own sake? How would that worth be measured? (Usefulness is a measurement.) "The good is what is worth having." -- "The good is the beneficial." -- "The good is the visually pleasing." We call various different things good, not only useful things.

Need a distinction be made between 'good in itself' and 'good for some purpose'? And is not making that distinction an instance of "concept-blindness" -- i.e. does one who does not make that distinction miss some feature of reality (If you are blind to the concept 'elm tree', then you do not see elm trees and therefore you miss a feature of reality)?

If Socrates says that acting correctly towards the gods is useful, that friends are useful (Indeed Xenophon's Socrates does say that) -- in sum, is not regarding everything from the point of view of its usefulness no more than a way of looking at things? Or is it an hypothesis (statement of fact) that all good things are useful?

As Aristotle defines 'kindness' it is an act from which the doer receives no benefit. Kindness is not "good in relationship to what it is useful for". (Anything can be forced into a classification scheme, but then having classification schemes loses its point. Making distinctions.)

The good = the useful is a metaphysical thesis about the essence of the good, whereas we in fact use the word 'good' in diverse ways; it has no essential meaning. (The solution is prosaic, but that is the solution.)

"... seems it to you so small a thing and worthless"

The distinction between means and ends: ends as goods in themselves, not in relation to anything else. In relationship to what is being a good man useful? In relationship to what is living in accord with the specific excellence that is proper to man useful? A noble life. Are these not things we want for themselves alone (goods in themselves)? (Epictetus, Discourses iii, 24) Has the word combination 'Why do you want what is good?' a meaning?

"Ethics is knowledge"

If the good is the useful, then ethics is knowledge of what is useful to one who seeks to live in accord with the excellence that is proper to his nature.

After David Hume the consensus is unused to reasoning about ethics; it is accustomed to convictions, conscience, imperatives, to the notion that ethics has, and can have, no foundation. The contrary view held by Socrates and Aristotle is that what is good can be verified by reason examining experience.

And that view must be the position from which thinking must start. And if it does not, it is not philosophy. To seek to know by the natural light of reason alone (thoroughgoing rationalism) is philosophy's aim, the philosophical project.

What is the good for man? In the ancient Greek view that question was equivalent to the questions: What is man's particular form of excellence? and What is the function of man's existence? Is the question 'Why should man want to be a good man?' nonsense (i.e. an undefined combination of words)? Compare 'Why should man want to be happy?' (In philosophy, being happy and being good are the same thing.)

Destruction and Construction

After Hume the consensus has been to criticize in philosophy rather than think constructively, to seek only negative results to the question "Is there such a thing as philosophical knowledge?" Before thinking about the historical Socrates and the Greeks, the founders of philosophy, I myself had only ever thought destructively (This may be related to why I came to philosophy). But both types of thinking belong to philosophy -- and in Socratic philosophy destruction is done for the sake of construction -- i.e. Socrates seeks to know the truth and to destroy only false claims to knowledge. But if in our day someone is going to understand philosophy that way, he is going to have to start all over again.

Friendship

... while some strive to cultivate a tree for its fruit, most bestow but an idle and listless care on their most fruitful possession, the name of which is "friend". (Memorabilia ii, 4, 7)

Again, I once heard him exhort a listener -- for so I interpreted his words -- to examine himself and to ask how much he was worth to his friends. (ii, 5, 1)

That is the "primitive utilitarianism" or simple-minded usefulness of Xenophon's Socrates that Schweitzer speaks of, because Socrates goes on to compare how much a friend is worth in comparison to how much any particular servant is worth -- each has a different monetary value.

If the good = the useful, then a good friend= a useful friend.

"I think you mean, Socrates, that if we are to win a good man's friendship, we ourselves must be good in word and deed alike?" (ii, 6, 14; cf. Laches 188c-189a)

The Sophists ("teachers of wisdom") in contrast to Socrates

He marvelled that anyone should make money by the profession of virtue, and should not reflect that his highest reward would be the gain of a good friend ... (i, 2, 7)

Xenophon's Final View of Socrates

All who knew what manner of man Socrates was and who seek after virtue continue to this day to miss him beyond all others, as the chief of helpers in the quest of virtue. For myself, I have described him as he was:

To me then he seemed to be all that a truly good and happy man must be. But if there is any doubter, let him set the character of other men beside these things; then let him judge. (Memorabilia iv, 8, 11)

What Socrates discussed with his companions

His own conversation was ever of human things. The problems he discussed were, What is godly, what is ungodly; what is beautiful, what is ugly; what is just, what is unjust; what is prudence, what is madness; what is courage, what is cowardice; what is a state, what is a statesman .... these and others like them, of which the knowledge made a "gentleman", in his estimation, while ignorance should involve the reproach of "slavishness". (i, 1, 16)

The Greek "gentleman"

According to C.E. Robinson, the Greek word translated as 'gentleman' is "composed of two words -- 'agathos', which covered every shade of meaning between brave, public-spirited and good, and 'kalos' which covered every shade between good, noble and beautiful" (Zito Hellas (1946) vi, 6; cf. the 'gentleman' of the Renaissance).

Socrates' Self-control

No less wonderful is it to me that some believed the charge brought against Socrates of corrupting the youth. In the first place, apart from what I have said, in control of his own passions and appetites he was the strictest of men; further, in endurance of cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most resolute; and besides, his needs were so schooled to moderation that having very little he was yet very content.

Such was his own character: how then can he have led others into impiety, crime, gluttony, lust, or sloth? On the contrary, he cured these vices in many, by putting into them a desire for goodness, and by giving them confidence that self-discipline would make them gentlemen. To be sure he never professed to teach this; but, by letting his own light shine, he led his disciples to hope that they through imitation of him would attain to such excellence. (Memorabilia i, 2, 1-3)

Furthermore, he himself never neglected the body, and reproved such neglect in others. Thus over-eating followed by over-exertion he disapproved. But he approved of taking as much hard exercise as is agreeable to the soul; for the habit not only insured good health, but did not hamper the care of the soul. (i, 2, 4)

Of sensual passion he would say: "Avoid it resolutely: it is not easy to control yourself once you meddle with that sort of thing." (i, 3, 8)

Xenophon's own view

To me indeed it seems that whatever is honourable, whatever is good in conduct is the result of training [i.e. regular practice], and that this is especially true of prudence [i.e. self-control]. For in the same body along with the soul [the mind] are planted the pleasures which call to her: "Abandon prudence, and make haste to gratify us and the body." (i, 2, 23)

Why the Gods and Socrates are Free

Antiphon [the Sophist] came to Socrates with the intention of drawing his companions away from him, and spoke thus in their presence.

"The worst in everything" (Epictetus)

"Socrates, I supposed that philosophy must add to one's store of happiness. But the fruits you have reaped from philosophy are apparently very different. For example, you are living a life that would drive even a slave to desert his master. Your meat and drink are of the poorest: the cloak you wear is not only a poor thing, but is never changed summer or winter; and you never wear shoes or tunic. Besides you refuse to take money, the mere getting of which is a joy, while its possession makes one more independent and happier. Now the professors of other subjects try to make their pupils copy their teachers: if you too intend to make your companions do that, you must consider yourself a professor of unhappiness."

To this Socrates replied: "... Come then, let us consider together what hardship you have noticed in my life. Is it that those who take money are bound to carry out the work for which they get a fee, while I, because I refuse to take it, am not obliged to talk with anyone against my will? ... As for cloaks, they are changed, as you know, on account of cold or heat. And shoes are worn as a protection to the feet against pain and inconvenience in walking. Now did you ever know me to stay indoors more than others on account of the cold, or to fight with any man for the shade because of the heat, or to be prevented from walking anywhere by sore feet? Do you not know that by training, a puny weakling comes to be better at any form of exercise he practises ...? Seeing then that I am always training my body to answer any and every call on its powers, do you not think that I can stand every strain better than you can without training?

For what and by what does the philosopher live?

Plato says that the philosopher is not driven by fear of something worse or by desire for greater pleasures, but is only willing to exchange pleasure for wisdom (Phaedo 68d-69c). The philosopher lives for wisdom (the philosopher is a lover of wisdom), not pleasure. The philosopher's happiness lies in wisdom, not in pleasure or the absence of fear. "In fact, it is wisdom that makes possible courage and self-control and integrity or, in a word, true goodness, and the presence or absence of pleasures and fears and other such feelings makes no difference at all" (ibid. 69a-b, tr. Tredennick).

And Socrates

For the longest time I asked myself, What does Socrates live for? And I answered, For the good alone, for all that is good in our life. But that answer did not satisfy me, for it seemed too much like the answer "for enjoyment of the good" or "for pleasure" by any other name (never mind that many good things are beyond reach). And yet the answer was right in front of me, staring back in the very etymology of the word 'philosophy' -- the philosopher is not a lover of the good; the philosopher is the lover of wisdom. Socrates lived for the sake of wisdom.

"Growing in goodness"

As above, in the following again Xenophon attributes his own unexceptional ideas to Socrates.

For avoiding slavery to the belly or to sleep and incontinence, is there, think you, any more effective specific than the possession of other and greater pleasures, which are delightful not only to enjoy, but also because they arouse hopes of lasting benefit? And again, you surely know that while he who supposes that nothing goes well with him is unhappy, he who believes that he is successful in farming or a shipping concern or any other business he is engaged in is happy in the thought of his prosperity. Do you think then that out of all this thinking there comes anything so pleasant as the thought: "I am growing in goodness and I am making better friends?" And that, I may say, is my constant thought. (Memorabilia i, 6, 1-9)

"You seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance. But my belief is that to have no wants is divine; to have as few as possible comes next to the divine ..." (i, 6, 10)

The gods are completely free because they have neither wants nor needs they must satisfy. Thus to be god-like is to have the fewest material needs (i.e. needs in order to live) and wants (i.e. desires for the superfluous). A rich man is not god-like, because his wealth simply allows him to satisfy his appetites, not to be free of them.

In answer to the question of where a wise man stores his wealth, both Socrates' students Antisthenes and Aristippus answered: where if he is shipwrecked he can swim ashore with it (Diog. L. vi, 6, and Vitruvius). But what could his "wealth" be, then, if not in his wisdom (and good character: the self-control guided by his education)? (cf. Plato, Phaedo 107d)

The freedom of Socrates, like the freedom of his Stoic descendants, is not wealth: freedom is self-sufficiency. ("So many things I can do without!")

He schooled his body and soul [in such a way that] it is hardly possible to imagine a man doing so little work as not to earn enough to satisfy the needs of Socrates. He ate just sufficient food to make eating a pleasure, and he was so ready for his food that he found appetite the best sauce: and any kind of drink he found pleasant, because he drank only when he was thirsty. (Memorabilia i, 3, 5)

"Should not every man hold self-control to be the foundation of all virtue, and first lay this foundation firmly in his soul? For who without this can learn any good or practise it worthily? Or what man that is the slave of his pleasures is not in an evil plight body and soul alike?"

But it has already been said that the "foundation of all virtue" is, not self-control, but wisdom: moral virtue is knowledge. Self-control directed towards the good is a moral virtue, but self-control is not itself the foundation of moral virtue because a man ignorant of the good will direct his self-control towards wrong-doing.

Such were his words; but his own self-control was shown yet more clearly by his deeds than by his words. For he kept in subjection not only the pleasures of the body, but those too that money brings ... (i, 5, 5-6)

Religious Views

Xenophon says that Socrates was not a "freethinker" in religion. Yet if Socrates puts even divine words to the tests of reason and experience (and he himself tells us that he does in the apologies of both Xenophon and Plato), his views are not dogmatic as Xenophon portrays them. This does not mean that Socrates was not pious, i.e. that he did not do his duty towards the gods (Gorgias 507a-b, Laches 199d-e), but that Socrates' use of reason was universal, as the philosopher's reason must be.

For, like most men, indeed, he believed that the gods are heedful of mankind [cf. Plato, Apology 41c-d], but with an important difference; for whereas they do not believe in the omniscience of the gods, Socrates thought that they know all things, our words and deeds and secret purposes; that they are present everywhere, and grant signs to men of all that concerns man. (Memorabilia i, 1, 19)

I wonder, then, how the Athenians can have been persuaded that Socrates was a freethinker, when he never said or did anything contrary to sound religion, and his utterances about the gods and his behaviour towards them were the words and actions of a man who is truly religious and deserves to be thought so. (i, 1, 20)

The philosopher and current beliefs

In the Phaedrus, Plato has Socrates say that so long as he is ignorant of what the Delphian inscription enjoins -- namely so long as he does not yet "know himself" -- to be enquiring into other things seems to him ridiculous. "Consequently," he says, "I don't bother about them, but accept the current beliefs" (Phaedrus 229e-230a, tr. Hackforth); "the common opinion is enough for me" (tr. Jowett). And one of those "common opinions" was that the gods are mindful of us, concerned for our well-being.

But Plato is not correct: the philosopher (the Socratic philosopher) holds no opinion about what he has not put to the test (examined); he does not "accept current beliefs" (no more than he holds preconceptions). Recall that "Socrates used to say that he knew only his own ignorance." And he said that consistently.

[Part of knowing oneself is to know one's duty towards God (about which maybe Hesiod offers a clue), and most surely it is if God is identified with the true (as Apollo is) and the good (as all gods, being fully rational, are). But about the gods and what one's duty towards them is, the question is indeed "obscure" (Protagoras), and man can have only "opinions", not knowledge: one cannot know oneself in this respect beyond knowing that one does not know. What one can know, however, is that impiety (intentional sacrilege) and irreverence are contrary to rational moral virtue, but that modesty is not.]

Socrates and illegal orders

When [he was] chairman in the Assemblies [Socrates] would not permit the people to record an illegal vote, but, upholding the laws, resisted a popular impulse that might even have overborne any but himself. And when the Thirty laid a command on him that was illegal, he refused to obey. Thus he disregarded their repeated injunction not to talk with young men; and when they commanded him and certain other citizens to arrest a man on a capital charge, he alone refused, because the command laid on him was illegal. (Memorabilia iv, 4, 2-4; cf. i, 1, 17-18)

In Xenophon's Apology, Socrates accepts the sentence of death because he is an old man who has nothing before him except to be diminished in mind and body, neither of which would be good.

in Plato's Crito another reason is given: that to escape from prison, despite his innocence, would not be wise but wrong-doing, because it would undermine the laws that are the foundation of the Athenian way of life, laws which he has accepted all his life and which he says are like a father to the Athenians.

Likewise, one should not obey an illegal order, because that too is wrong-doing: it too undermines the rule of law, the foundation of civilized life.

The Law and Justice (Xenophon's view of their relationship)

Xenophon's equation of Just with Lawful and Lawful with Just shows not a debased notion of Justice but an elevated notion of Law: whatever Law is, it is not merely whatever some legislators enact.

Xenophon's "understanding in part"

As for his claim that he was forewarned by "the deity" what he ought to do and what not to do, some may think that it must have been a delusion because he was condemned to death. But they should remember two facts. First, he had already reached such an age, that had he not died then, death must have come to him soon after. Secondly, he escaped the most irksome stage of life and the inevitable diminution of mental powers, and instead won glory by the moral strength revealed in the wonderful honesty and frankness and probity of his defence, and in the equanimity and manliness with which he bore the sentence of death. (Memorabilia iv, 8, 1)

Socrates could not have "won glory by his defence" other than by simply telling the truth. Xenophon's old age justification may show partial understanding, but it fails to encompass Socrates. For there is plainly something else at work here: would Socrates' defense (apologia) have been different if he had been a young man with many years of health before him? And would Socrates have misled -- i.e. lied to -- the jury for the sake of having them put him to death? So that Xenophon's account seems to show that Xenophon "understands but in part".

"Preparing for my defense all my life"

I will repeat what Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, told me about [Socrates]. "... I [Hermogenes] told him that he ought to be thinking about his defence. His first remark was, "Don't you think that I have been preparing for it all my life?" And when I asked him how, he said that he had been constantly occupied in the consideration of right and wrong, and in doing what was right and avoiding what was wrong, which he regarded as the best preparation for a defence. (Memorabilia iv, 8, 4)

"Of all men living, Socrates most wise"

"Don't you see that to this day I never would acknowledge that any man had lived a better or a pleasanter life than I? For they live best, I think, who strive best to become as good as possible: and the pleasantest life is theirs who are conscious that they are growing in goodness.

"And to this day that has been my experience; and mixing with others and closely comparing myself with them, I have held without ceasing to this opinion of myself." (iv, 8, 6-7)

Xenophon is unable not to identify the good with the pleasant, despite what he has said about Socrates, namely that he always chose the better (the good) rather than the pleasanter way. The words "I never would acknowledge that any man had lived a better or a pleasanter life than I" could be taken to be how Xenophon would have interpreted the oracle's words that no man is wiser than Socrates.

When Critias and Charicles made it illegal to teach the "art of words"

... although [Socrates] was himself free from vice, if he saw and approved of base conduct in [his companions], he would be open to censure. Well, when he found that Critias loved Euthydemus and wanted to lead him astray, he tried to restrain him by saying that it was mean and unbecoming in a gentleman to sue like a beggar to the object of his affection, whose good opinion he coveted, stooping to ask a favour that it was wrong to grant. As Critias paid no heed whatever to this protest, Socrates, it is said, exclaimed in the presence of Euthydemus and many others, "Critias seems to have the feelings of a pig: he can no more keep away from Euthydemus than pigs can help rubbing themselves against stones."

Now Critias bore a grudge against Socrates for this; and when he was one of the Thirty and was drafting laws with Charicles, he ... inserted a clause which made it illegal "to teach the art of words". It was a calculated insult to Socrates, whom he saw no means of attacking, except by imputing to him the practice constantly attributed to philosophers ["of making the worse appear the better argument" (Marchant) (cf. Plato, Apology 23d)], and so making him unpopular. For I myself never heard Socrates indulge in the practice, nor knew of anyone who professed to have heard him do so. (Memorabilia i, 2, 29-31)

Cobblers, builders, and metal workers, and the subjects for which these supply illustrations

"May I question you," asked Socrates, "in case I do not understand any point in your orders?"

"You may," said they [Critias and Charicles].

"Well now," said he, "I am ready to obey the laws. But lest I unwittingly transgress through ignorance, I want clear directions from you. Do you think that the art of words from which you bid me abstain is associated with sound or unsound reasoning? For if with sound, then clearly I must abstain from sound reasoning but if with unsound, clearly I must try to reason soundly." (i, 2, 33-34)

"But you see, Socrates," explained Critias, "you will have to avoid your favourite topic, -- the cobblers, builders and metal workers; for it is already worn to rags by you in my opinion."

"Then must I keep off the subjects of which these supply illustrations, Justice, Holiness, and so forth?" (i, 2, 37)

Jowett says to compare Gorgias 490, 491, 517: "cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors" (footnote to Plato's Symposium 221e). (Aristophanes parodies Socratic analogy in The Clouds, as when giving an explanation to Strepsiades (line 383 ff.), Socrates compares the source of thunder in the clouds to the effects of broth-puddings on the human stomach.)

The "art of words" is the method of dialectic or logic (Memorabilia i, 2, 34). Critias's "love" for the youth Euthydemus was of course physical. From which we can see that Socratic love is what we call friendship.

Comments about Scholars' Comments

Plato, assuming that only the definable could be known, and equating the object of knowledge with reality, concluded that forms, rather than concrete individuals, constituted the real world. (Guthrie, Plato ... earlier period, p. 114)

Whatever can be defined is real, and whatever is real can be defined. Whatever cannot be defined is unreal. Now, what does Plato mean by 'defined' -- what is a 'Platonic definition'?

Plato's Forms

According to Plato's first teacher Heraclitus, only what is unchanging can be an object of knowledge ("definable"). What doesn't change is the essence of a thing ("that without which something is not what it is"), not without the thing ceasing to be what it is. But "concrete individuals" can cease to be (they are perishable) and therefore their essences must exist independently of them, as archetypes do. The individual cup ceases to be, but the pattern (or "form") of the cup ("cup-ness" or "cup-hood") does not.

What Socrates, according to Aristotle, sought were the defining common qualities of the moral virtues, the essences of e.g. holiness, justice, courage, and so on. Plato extended this search to all common names, and called the common natures or essences of things 'forms'. The forms are unchanging, eternal, otherworldly (suprasensible, imperceptible to the senses).

What is important here is that "Plato [is] assuming ...", because an assumption is not the result of an investigation. It's true that "only the definable can be known", i.e. that phenomena without concepts are unknowable -- but it does not follow from this that concepts rather than phenomena "constitute the real world" (reality).

Aristotle says that, unlike Plato, Socrates "did not regard his universal [general, essential] definitions, as separable from things" (Metaphysics 1078a).

Literary Inventions

The dialogues of Plato show him going beyond this primitive utilitarianism [i.e. the Memorabilia's "the good is the useful"] and seeking a conception of the good which has been made something inward and aims at the well-being of the soul. How much of these more advanced views are the Master's own, and how much of his own thoughts his pupil has in this way put into his mouth ... (Albert Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, 2nd ed. (London, 1929), tr. C.T. Campion, v, p. 33)

In Plato's un-Socratic dialog the Phaedo, wisdom is a condition of the Platonic soul, withdrawn as it is from the senses into the realm of Absolutes (Forms); wisdom = knowledge of the Absolutes is inward. Philosophy is the "profession of dying". The well-being of the soul is to know the Good itself; for Plato it is the primacy of the thought (to ponder the Good), whereas for Socrates it had been the primacy of the deed (to do what is good is to be good): ethics is about how man should live his life -- it is directed outwards. (Although of course the man whose life is directed towards the good will not harbor evil thoughts; that and holding discourse with oneself are the inner part of Socratic ethics.)

According to his translator E.C. Marchant, the same question may be asked of Xenophon's account as of Plato's: how much of his own thought did Xenophon put into the mouth of Socrates? Each author may have understood Socrates in his own way and as he was able, but there is also the question of how much these authors treated Socrates as a literary character rather than as an historical figure.

Was not "the well-being of the soul" what Socrates meant when he said that "I am growing in goodness ..." (Memorabilia i, vi, 9) -- or does the Socrates of Xenophon not use that type of language -- "think in those terms": has he a different vocabulary ("thought world")? No, Xenophon too uses the expression "care of the soul" (i, 2, 4). But for Socrates the soul is cared for by logical discourse and resultant deeds, not by contemplation.

Can the historical Socrates be found, or can we do no more than make a selection of whichever facts seem correct to us (and this selection may unavoidably reflect what we want Socrates to have been, or not to have been, for some, e.g. Marcus Cato and Voltaire, seek to make the worst not the best of him)? Reasons for a selection can be given, but maybe plausible reasons can be given for other choices as well.

My own view of Socrates is much closer to Eduard Zeller's view than either to Guthrie's view or to Schweitzer's view (which ascribes "primitive utilitarianism" to Socrates, which I think is wrong, because the good is not identical with the useful: the philosopher does not live for the useful, much less for "rational pleasure" (Protagoras 356b-c), but for philosophy and moral virtue).

Plato's dialogs and their author

... there is not and will not be any written work of Plato's own. What are now called his are the work of a Socrates embellished [i.e. fictionalized] and modernized. (Plato, Letters ii 314b-c, tr. Post)

Guthrie does not appear to regard this letter as genuine, but he renders it "a Socrates spruced up and brought up to date" or "made new" (Plato ... earlier period p. 66). If the letter is genuine, then it would be evidence that Plato regarded the character of Socrates in his dialogs as a literary invention, indeed as an idealization (with Plato's penchants) of the historical Socrates. So that the opinions of that character are what Plato thought to be the truth (Phaedo 91b), even if those opinions really belong to Heraclitus, Parmenides or Plato himself rather than to the historical Socrates.

Cicero said that he put his views into the mouth of Marcus Cato in order to lend them more weight (On Old Age). But I don't think that is how Plato uses Socrates or the "visitor from Elea" in his dialogs; they are, rather, used as representatives of lines of thought. As for Xenophon, I think that in addition to whatever he knew of the historical Socrates, out of his high regard for Socrates, Xenophon puts whatever else he judges to be wisdom in Socrates' mouth.

"True belief plus an account"

In the Theaetetus Plato appears to present destructive criticism of the Socrates of Xenophon's standard for knowing in philosophy, namely "being able to give an account to others of what you know", a standard which is also found in Plato: "And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?" (Laches 190c, tr. Jowett).

But what is criticized in the Theaetetus is not that standard Socrates set, because the Theaetetus adds the notion of "true belief" to the Socratic "account". Thus "knowledge" becomes "true belief + an account". But that notion is foreign to Socrates' thinking, suggesting as it does that a state of mind (condition of the soul) is the meaning of the word 'knowledge' ("having" an account) rather than a public defense of a proposition or thesis ("giving" an account).

THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, I have heard someone make the distinction. I had forgotten but now it comes back to me. He said that true belief with the addition of an account (logos) was knowledge, while belief without an account was outside its range. When no account could be given of a thing, it was not knowable -- that was the word he used -- where it could, it was knowable. (Theaetetus 201c-d, tr. Cornford)

By 'an account' here Plato means 'an essential definition', which is what Socrates sought ("may be"), but Plato prescribed ("must be").

As to the "justified" and "true" parts of Plato's proposed definition, "justified" means that there are sufficient grounds to say that the proposition is true. And that proposition = account is "true" if it is an essential definition. But if someone can prove (demonstrate) when cross-questioned that the proposition = account is true, then he does not believe that it is true; he knows that it is true.

Then as to the "belief" part of Plato's proposed definition, 'belief' and 'knowledge' are distinct and exclusive concepts; knowledge is not a kind of belief (knowledge belongs to the community and is publicly verifiable). One cannot both believe and know the same thing (Either one knows it or one believes it, not both) -- which is a reminder, a description, of how we use this language.

Where the "grammars" or rules for use of the words 'knowledge' and 'belief' intersect is in their relation to the concept 'grounds' ('justification') -- the word 'belief' is applied to insufficient grounds; 'knowledge' to sufficient grounds. According to Plato's standard, sufficient grounds = essential definition.

In contrast, as Socrates uses the word 'account', the type of 'know' = 'give an account of what you know to others' is the type of "language game" (cf. PI II, xi, p. 224). There are as many types of accounts as there are types of propositions.

What we are investigating here is the interrelationships of concepts (definitions of words).

"Knowledge is one thing, always the same"

Well, that is precisely what I am puzzled about. I cannot make out to my own satisfaction what knowledge is. Can we answer that question? (Theaetetus 146a)

It is word magic to take the word 'knowledge' as proof that there is a single thing named 'knowledge', a essence, and that this thing is the meaning of the word 'knowledge' or "what knowledge is".

The philosopher will never find the way out of Plato's puzzlement if he assumes there is an essence when there may not be one. And this is a false instance of "Socratic ignorance", because while saying that he does not know what knowledge is, Plato nonetheless thinks he knows at least one thing about it which he does not know, namely that knowledge is one thing, always the same.

Plato's presuming to know what he does not know in this case is the self-constructed cage which he has locked himself into. It is Platonic preconception as self-mystification.

Was Plato's presumption also that of the historical Socrates -- that the ethical virtues must have essential natures? Induction was Socrates' method, and the result of inductive investigation comes at its end, not at its beginning. Preconceived necessity and "not thinking you know what you do not know" are incompatible.

The foundation of Socrates' Ethics

Socrates (470-399 B.C.) ... his conviction that what is moral can be determined by thought. Beyond that general statement he does not go.... Socrates stands outside the philosophic efforts to reach a complete world-view. He ... is busied simply with man in his relation to himself and to society.... Socrates gives [ethics] no foundation but themselves. (Civilization and Ethics (1929), tr. Campion, v, p. 34-35)

Schweitzer says that Socrates' ethics does not derive from a world-view, i.e. a view "about the nature and object of the world ... and the position and the destiny of mankind and of individual men within it" (The Decay and the Restoration of Civilization, 2nd ed. (1932), tr. C.T. Campion, v, p. 80). But it does derive from a view about the nature of man.

"Rational moral virtue"

Socrates' ethics is based on the beliefs (1) that the good for a thing is the specific excellence (areté) that is proper to that thing, and (2) that the excellence proper to man is reason. And thus the question for ethics ("how to live our life") is: what then is the rational way of life?

That is, Socrates' ethics is founded in his obedience to the Delphic precept "Know thyself", because from this seeking comes knowledge of man's specific areté. That excellence is determined by what man's nature is.

I have elsewhere criticised Schweitzer's claim that in "Socrates the ethical mysticism of devotion to the inner voice takes the place of the complete world-view ..." (Civilization and Ethics (1929), v, p. 35), on the grounds that whatever the voice tells him is -- as were the words of Apollo's oracle -- put to the tests of reason and experience, which are Socrates' only guides. Philosophy is thoroughgoingly rational; even Socratic piety is infused with reason.

But Socrates does not have a "world-view" in Schweitzer's sense: he has no view of why (how and with what purpose) the world exists or what man's destiny (death) either as an individual or mankind is. "All is mystery," as Schweitzer says. Socrates' ethics is not founded on a "world-view".

The ancient world if not for Socrates

Were the Sophists really a threat to the Athenian way of life? Was Greece after the death of Socrates and his generation a world in decline? Schweitzer thought that it was and wrote these words in praise of Socrates:

In that perilous hour when Western thought comes to the point of having to philosophize about the moral in order to arrest the dissolution of Greek society which has been begun by a body of unstable and disputatious teachers, the wise man of Athens shatters all scepticism by the mighty earnestness of his conviction that what is moral can be determined by thought ... he is the source of that serious spirit in which antiquity after his day busied itself with the problem. What would that ancient world have become without him? (Civilization and Ethics (1929), tr. Campion, v, p. 34)

Schweitzer was right to write about life's meaning, and Wittgenstein was wrong not to: thoughts have to be put into words -- i.e. written down (Recollections p. 109) -- to allow them to develop and be criticized -- something silence [TLP 7] cannot do. This is holding discourse with oneself.

Our philosophy is, indirectly, a critique of our life.

Schweitzer's question to philosophy

... to put to Western thought the question what it has been aiming at ... What has it to offer us when we demand from it those [elementary] ideas which we need if we are to take our position in life as men who are growing in character through the experience given by work? (Civilization and Ethics (1929), tr. Campion, Preface, p. v)

... the problems of personal morality and of the relation of man to man, problems with which we are concerned every day and every hour, and in which we must become ethical personalities. (ibid. xvi, p. 183)

The way of life of logic studies is sweet to us ("the sloth of the study", confined to movement between the teapot and the desk chair), whereas the rest of the good for man is not.

Epictetus: "Choose the way of life that is noblest, because habit will make it sweet to you". That is why Socrates could find himself "growing in goodness".

Socrates way of thinking things all the way through in discussion (the logical search for understanding) and his vigilant self-control (rather than doing wrong through bad habit and impulse) -- seems a bright but very distant ideal. "For I am not what I say I ought to be, although it seems I do not really want to change my way of life." Is this because I am ignorant of the good?

According to Socrates it must be that I think I know what I do not know, and since no one seeks to know what he thinks he already knows, I must be thinking I am wise when I am not.

What is necessary is knowing the truth, not "strength of will" -- as if what were needed were the strength to act rationally -- i.e. as if one wanted to go against one's knowledge of the good, and harm one's rational moral self, which is absurd. It is, in Socratic view, a mistake to look to "the will" rather than to the understanding (knowledge of the good).

[Plato holds the body responsible for the soul's wrong-doing (Cratylus 403d-404a, where the body bars man from virtue) and Phaedo 66b-d where the body bars the soul from the truth.]

Ancient portrait painting

When historians use the words 'probably' and 'no doubt' and 'perhaps', these words are refuges for ignorance, not sound historiography, much less history ("what really happened", in Thucydides' words [2.48.3]). The temptation is to imaginatively paint in the blank spaces and then mistake the paint for reality. Speculation becomes thinking one knows what one doesn't know.

Socrates as philosophy, not history

Note: the following is related to other remarks about whether we can know who Socrates was, and about the relation of the historical Socrates to philosophy (and history), as well as Aristotle's identification of Plato's other teachers in philosophy (Heraclitus and Parmenides) who influenced him more deeply than Socrates.

Schweitzer wrote about Plato and Socrates:

... how much of his own thoughts his pupil has in this way put into his mouth, cannot now be decided. (Civilization and Ethics (1929), v, p. 33)

Guthrie often points out scholarly disagreements. And maybe we make for ourselves a portrait of Socrates from among a selection of facts, legends and literary inventions. We recognize that there may be other plausible possibilities, and that our portrait-making is directed by our own idea, and maybe by who we want the historical Socrates to have been. (Apropos of which I would say that Pascal's words apply, that "There is enough light for those who desire only to see, and enough darkness for those of a contrary disposition" (Pensées vii, 430). The philosophical ideals are there, but so are the different possible ways of seeing things, e.g. "Socratic irony", one noble, one otherwise.)

I would now say I think there are things we can know about the historical Socrates that allow us to make a sharp distinction between the historical Socrates and Plato.

The romantic rebellion against rationality

I dare do all that may become a man. Who dares do more is none. (Macbeth i, 7)

That word 'image', for which I used 'portrait' above, comes from Dostoyevsky, who wrote that from time to time he made for himself "an image of Christ" -- for the reason Plato states -- to "inspire himself with confidence" (Phaedo 114d) in his life of Christian faith, as Phaedo had in philosophy. But there is a sharp contrast between Dostoyevsky's romanticism and Socrates' thoroughgoing use of reason as guides to how man should live.

Socrates ... his conviction that what is moral can be determined by thought. (Civilization and Ethics (1929), v, p. 34)

The only knowledge man has in ethics is of the specific excellence that is proper and unique to man, and according to Socrates that excellence is reason, and the good for man is to be everywhere guided by it (to live a life of rational moral virtue). But Dostoyevsky utterly rejects that idea.

Human beings, he says, sometimes choose to behave irrationally, knowing full well that what they choose is irrational -- and that the choice to behave irrationally (as does a gambler, which Dostoyevsky tells us that he was for a time until one winter when he pawned his young wife's only overcoat) is fundamental to what it means to be human: Being free is to act irrationally (to embrace the whirlwind) ... otherwise man is no more free than a calculating machine.

If he had been asked this question, Dostoyevsky might have answered that: Freedom is the excellence proper to man, and its exercise -- even when contrary to what reason says is the good -- is the good for man. (But is the good, then, not the good?)

Freedom is an excellence, but is it the excellence that is uniquely defining of man? It is not to be thought that the Athenians were not lovers of freedom, nor that the victories at Marathon and Salamis did not assure the survival of philosophy. Indeed, in Gorgias 461e, Plato praises "Athens, the one spot in Greece where there is the utmost freedom of speech" (tr. Woodhead), something indispensable to philosophy (discourse of reason) as Socrates practiced it.

But of what benefit is freedom to man if he does not know what to do with it (cf. self-control) -- i.e. how to live a life that is guided by the true and the good. Moreover, more important than to be free is to be morally virtuous, which is possible for a slave as for a free-man.

What is the good, according to Socrates, is a question for reason, not for passion (instinct, impulse) to decide (for Socrates, conscience = reason). And if he is mistaken about what is the good for man, that must be shown by reason -- i.e. by refutation in discussion -- and by nothing less.

If there were a calculating machine that would tell man in the particular case what is good, what bad, its pronouncements would have the same place in philosophy as Socrates' "divine guide" (Plato, Apology 31c-d) or the oracle at Delphi -- i.e. its guidance would be something to be put to the test in discussion, to be agreed to or refuted.

[In historical context, Dostoyevsky was reacting against the notion of a calculus of "enlightened self-interest" (enlightened = rational), the supposed good for man, which was being put forth by such men as Chernyshevsky: "Life is a commercial transaction."]

"What would that ancient world have become without Socrates?" Schweitzer asked. What would have become of philosophy? Thinking ourselves wise when we are not.

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